The person inside your prospect who likes you has two possible futures, and neither of them is being promoted for choosing the Estonian company.
If it goes well, the project went well. That’s the outcome everybody expected when they approved the budget.
If it goes badly, they picked an unknown supplier from a country of 1.3 million people, and somewhere in the email archive is the message where they recommended you over the name everyone had heard of.
That asymmetry is the competition. Not your feature list, not your pricing, not the thing you’ve spent two years making genuinely better than the incumbent. You are competing on who absorbs the career risk of the decision, and once you see the deal that way, almost everything in your sales process is aimed at the wrong target.
Keynes wrote this down in 1936
He was describing fund managers rather than procurement, but the mechanism is identical and he was more precise about it than any sales book I’ve read.
In chapter 12 of the General Theory, on the state of long-term expectation, he notes that the investor who most promotes the public interest is the one who comes in for most criticism, “wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks.” Then the part worth memorising:
“If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Notice the condition he attaches. The asymmetry appears wherever funds are managed by committees. It isn’t a flaw in individual character, it’s what happens structurally when somebody spends money on behalf of an organisation and is judged afterwards by average opinion.
Which is every B2B purchase above the amount one person can sign alone.
And here’s the uncomfortable consequence for you. Your product being better is not neutral in this situation. If choosing you requires your champion to have been clever, you’ve made their position worse, because being cleverly right earns nothing and being cleverly wrong is unsurvivable. Being obviously right is safe. Being interestingly right is not.
What the large vendor is actually selling
Go and look at their proposal and you’ll find it is barely about the product.
It’s an analyst quadrant your champion can paste into a slide. A reference list of names the board recognises without explanation. A master agreement your procurement team has already approved, or one that looks like fifty they’ve approved before. A training ecosystem, so nobody is dependent on one person understanding the system.
None of that is a trick, and this is the part most founders in this position refuse to accept. It’s real risk reduction, sold honestly, to a buyer who has correctly identified that their biggest exposure isn’t product quality.
And sometimes they’re simply the right answer. If the buyer’s genuine requirement is continuity measured in decades, if the integration surface spans eleven internal systems, if they need to hire people who already know the tool, the large vendor wins on merit and you should stop spending time on that account. I wrote about the distribution version of this problem in why Estonia builds the better product and keeps losing, and about what a wrong-fit customer costs you in growing SaaS in a small market, which is the argument for walking away earlier than feels comfortable.
Four things that move the risk off your champion
This is the actual work, and none of it is marketing collateral.
References they can ring, not logos they can read. A logo on your website is a claim. A named person at a comparable company, in a comparable role, who has agreed to take a fifteen-minute call, is evidence your champion can forward to their boss. Offer that call unprompted and early, before anybody asks, because the offer itself is the signal.
A first phase small enough that being wrong is survivable. Not a free trial, and not a discount. The design criterion is not cheapness, it’s that failure wouldn’t have to be escalated to anybody. Here’s the test I’d use: what is the largest amount your champion can approve without asking permission? That number is your first phase. On how to price one without giving it away, I went through pilot pricing separately.
Write the downside into the contract, in plain language. Exit terms. What notice they need to give. Where their data goes and in what format. Who owns the work product. This feels like selling against yourself and it is the single strongest move available to a small vendor, for one reason: the large vendor’s contract is usually worse on precisely these points, and nobody reads it, so you win a comparison the buyer didn’t know they were making.
Answer the continuity question before anybody asks it. What happens if you get hit by a bus, or acquired, or simply stop. The wrong answer is reassurance. The right answer is specifics: who else can operate this, where the credentials and documentation live, what a handover actually looks like and how long it takes. The formal version of this conversation arrives as a vendor security questionnaire, and the companies that handle the questionnaire well are usually the ones that had the answer before the form arrived.
The thing that loses more deals than size does
Your champion has to sell you in a meeting you are not in.
That meeting lasts about four minutes, somebody senior asks two questions, and your champion answers from memory using whatever you gave them. Most vendors give them a pitch deck about the vendor. It is the wrong artefact, because nobody in that room is interested in you, they are deciding whether to back a colleague’s judgement.
What they need is one page, written in their company’s language, that makes the case to their management: what problem this solves in their terms, what it costs, what the first phase is, who else has done it, and a risk section that is already filled in and honest, including the risks of choosing you.
Write that page yourself and send it over. If you don’t, they’ll write it at eleven at night, badly, in a hurry, and you’ll lose to the obvious supplier and never find out why.
Nobody does this. I don’t entirely understand why, because it’s the cheapest thing on the list.
Where I come out
Stop trying to look bigger than you are. Looking bigger is a lie your champion then has to maintain on your behalf, and they can feel the weight of it. Making their decision defensible is a service you can actually perform, and it’s the one thing the large vendor cannot copy at your price.
One honest limit. If the real constraint is that procurement will not onboard a supplier below a certain size or turnover, you’re not losing on positioning. You’re ineligible, which is a different problem with different answers, and the routes in are in my notes on EU public tenders rather than in anything you can fix on a call.
Everywhere else, the job isn’t to be the clever choice. It’s to have quietly become the conventional one, inside that one building, before the decision gets made.
If you’re in a deal like this now and want a second read on what your champion is actually carrying, drop me a line on email, WhatsApp, phone or LinkedIn and we can have a quick chat, and my notes on marketing and sales alignment cover the rest. I’m taking on a small number of contracts at the moment, so I’ll tell you straight whether it’s something I could help with.